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Security in Ganeti

==================

Documents Ganeti version 2.11

Ganeti was developed to run on internal, trusted systems. As such, the

security model is all-or-nothing.

Up to version 2.3 all Ganeti code ran as root. Since version 2.4 it is

possible to run all daemons except the node daemon and the monitoring daemon

as non-root users by specifying user names and groups at build time.

The node daemon continues to require root privileges to create logical volumes,

DRBD devices, start instances, etc. Cluster commands can be run as root or by

users in a group specified at build time. The monitoring daemon requires root

privileges in order to be able to access and present information that are only

avilable to root (such as the output of the ``xm`` command of Xen).

Host issues

-----------

For a host on which the Ganeti software has been installed, but not

joined to a cluster, there are no changes to the system.

For a host that has been joined to the cluster, there are very important

changes:

- The host will have its SSH host key replaced with the one of the

  cluster (which is the one the initial node had at the cluster

  creation)

- A new public key will be added to root's ``authorized_keys`` file,

  granting root access to all nodes of the cluster. The private part of

  the key is also distributed to all nodes. Old files are renamed.

- Communication between nodes is encrypted using SSL/TLS. A common key

  and certificate combo is shared between all nodes of the cluster.  At

  this time, no CA is used.

- The Ganeti node daemon will accept RPC requests from any host within

  the cluster with the correct certificate, and the operations it will

  do as a result of these requests are:

  - running commands under the ``/etc/ganeti/hooks`` directory

  - creating DRBD disks between it and the IP it has been told

  - overwrite a defined list of files on the host

As you can see, as soon as a node is joined, it becomes equal to all

other nodes in the cluster, and the security of the cluster is

determined by the weakest node.

Note that only the SSH key will allow other machines to run any command

on this node; the RPC method will run only:

- well defined commands to create, remove, activate logical volumes,

  drbd devices, start/stop instances, etc;

- run well-defined SSH commands on other nodes in the cluster

- scripts under the ``/etc/ganeti/hooks`` directory

- scripts under the ``/etc/ganeti/restricted-commands`` directory, if

  this feature has been enabled at build time (see below)

It is therefore important to make sure that the contents of the

``/etc/ganeti/hooks`` and ``/etc/ganeti/restricted-commands``

directories are supervised and only trusted sources can populate them.

Restricted commands

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The restricted commands feature is new in Ganeti 2.7. It enables the

administrator to run any commands in the

``/etc/ganeti/restricted-commands`` directory, if the feature has been

enabled at build time, subject to the following restrictions:

- No parameters may be passed

- No absolute or relative path may be passed, only a filename

- The ``/etc/ganeti/restricted-commands`` directory must

  be owned by root:root and have mode 0755 or stricter

- Executables must be regular files or symlinks, and must be executable

  by root:root

Note that it's not possible to list the contents of the directory, and

there is an intentional delay when trying to execute a non-existing

command (to slow-down dictionary attacks).

Since for Ganeti itself this functionality is not needed, and is only

provided as a way to help administrate or recover nodes, it is a local

site decision whether to enable or not the restricted commands feature.

By default, this feature is disabled.

Cluster issues

--------------

As mentioned above, there are multiple ways of communication between

cluster nodes:

- SSH-based, for high-volume traffic like image dumps or for low-level

  command, e.g. restarting the Ganeti node daemon

- RPC communication between master and nodes

- DRBD real-time disk replication traffic

The SSH traffic is protected (after the initial login to a new node) by

the cluster-wide shared SSH key.

RPC communication between the master and nodes is protected using

SSL/TLS encryption. Both the client and the server must have the

cluster-wide shared SSL/TLS certificate and verify it when establishing

the connection by comparing fingerprints. We decided not to use a CA to

simplify the key handling.

The DRBD traffic is not protected by encryption, as DRBD does not

support this. It's therefore recommended to implement host-level

firewalling or to use a separate range of IP addresses for the DRBD

traffic (this is supported in Ganeti through the use of a secondary

interface) which is not routed outside the cluster. DRBD connections are

protected from erroneous connections to other machines (as may happen

due to software issues), and from accepting connections from other

machines, by using a shared secret, exchanged via RPC requests from the

master to the nodes when configuring the device.

Master daemon

-------------

The command-line tools to master daemon communication is done via a

UNIX socket, whose permissions are reset to ``0660`` after listening but

before serving requests. This permission-based protection is documented

and works on Linux, but is not-portable; however, Ganeti doesn't work on

non-Linux system at the moment.

Luxi daemon

-----------

The ``luxid`` daemon (automatically enabled if ``confd`` is enabled at

build time) serves local (UNIX socket) queries about the run-time

configuration. Answering these means talking to other cluster nodes,

exactly as ``masterd`` does. See the notes for ``masterd`` regarding

permission-based protection.

Conf daemon

-----------

In Ganeti 2.8, the ``confd`` daemon (if enabled at build time), serves

network-originated queries about parts of the static cluster

configuration.

If Ganeti is not configured (at build time) to use separate users,

``confd`` has access to all Ganeti related files (including internal RPC

SSL certificates). This makes it a bit more sensitive to bugs (a remote

attacker could get direct access to the intra-cluster RPC), so to harden

security it's recommended to:

- disable confd at build time if it (and ``luxid``) is not needed in

  your setup.

- configure Ganeti (at build time) to use separate users, so that the

  confd daemon doesn't also have access to the server SSL/TLS

  certificates.

- add firewall rules to protect the ``confd`` port or bind it to a

  trusted address. Make sure that all nodes can access the daemon, as

  the monitoring daemon requires it.

Monitoring daemon

-----------------

The monitoring daemon provides information about the status and the

performance of the cluster over HTTP.

It is currently unencrypted and non-authenticated, therefore it is strongly

advised to set proper firewalling rules to prevent unwanted access.

The monitoring daemon runs as root, because it needs to be able to access

privileged information (such as the state of the instances as provided by

the Xen hypervisor). Nevertheless, the security implications are mitigated

by the fact that the agent only provides reporting functionalities,

without the ability to actually modify the state of the cluster.

Remote API

----------

Starting with Ganeti 2.0, Remote API traffic is encrypted using SSL/TLS

by default. It supports Basic authentication as per :rfc:`2617`. Users

can be granted different capabilities. Details can be found in the

:ref:`RAPI documentation <rapi-users>`.

Paths for certificate, private key and CA files required for SSL/TLS

will be set at source configure time. Symlinks or command line

parameters may be used to use different files.

Inter-cluster instance moves

----------------------------

To move instances between clusters, different clusters must be able to

communicate with each other over a secure channel. Up to and including

Ganeti 2.1, clusters were self-contained entities and had no knowledge

of other clusters. With Ganeti 2.2, clusters can exchange data if tokens

(an encryption certificate) was exchanged by a trusted third party

before.

KVM Security

------------

When running KVM instances under Ganeti three security models ara

available: "none", "user" and "pool".

Under security model "none" instances run by default as root. This means

that, if an instance gets jail broken, it will be able to own the host

node, and thus the ganeti cluster. This is the default model, and the

only one available before Ganeti 2.1.2.

Under security model "user" an instance is run as the user specified by

the hypervisor parameter "security_domain". This makes it easy to run

all instances as non privileged users, and allows one to manually

allocate specific users to specific instances or sets of instances. If

the specified user doesn't have permissions a jail broken instance will

need some local privilege escalation before being able to take over the

node and the cluster. It's possible though for a jail broken instance to

affect other ones running under the same user.

Under security model "pool" a global cluster-level uid pool is used to

start each instance on the same node under a different user. The uids in

the cluster pool can be set with ``gnt-cluster init`` and ``gnt-cluster

modify``, and must correspond to existing users on all nodes. Ganeti

will then allocate one to each instance, as needed. This way a jail

broken instance won't be able to affect any other. Since the users are

handed out by ganeti in a per-node randomized way, in this mode there is

no way to make sure a particular instance is always run as a certain

user. Use mode "user" for that.

In addition to these precautions, if you want to avoid instances sending

traffic on your node network, you can use an iptables rule such as::

  iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner <uid>[-<uid>] -j LOG \

    --log-prefix "ganeti uid pool user network traffic"

  iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner <uid>[-<uid>] -j DROP

This won't affect regular instance traffic (that comes out of the tapX

allocated to the instance, and can be filtered or subject to appropriate

policy routes) but will stop any user generated traffic that might come

from a jailbroken instance.

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